qq-email
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection surface. The skill ingests untrusted data from an external source which is then presented to the agent. * Ingestion points:
scripts/receive.jsandscripts/get-body.jsfetch email subjects and bodies fromimap.qq.com. * Boundary markers: Absent. Email content is output directly to the agent's context without clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. * Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for bash command execution (viaBashtool) and file writing (viaWritetool). * Sanitization:scripts/get-body.jsperforms basic HTML tag removal but does not sanitize content against adversarial prompt instructions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Insecure connection settings. * Evidence: The IMAP configuration in
scripts/get-body.jsandscripts/receive.jsexplicitly setstlsOptions: { rejectUnauthorized: false }. This disables SSL/TLS certificate validation, exposing email contents and metadata to potential Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks during transit. - [SAFE]: Secret management. * Evidence: The skill correctly instructs the user to provide credentials via environment variables (
QQ_EMAIL_ACCOUNTandQQ_EMAIL_AUTH_CODE) and includes logic to verify their presence before execution, avoiding hardcoded secrets in the codebase.
Audit Metadata