stagehand-browser-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the web using an LLM (Claude Haiku 4.5) to drive browser interactions, which creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where a website could steer the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted web content retrieved through
browser navigate,browser extract, andbrowser observe(SKILL.md, REFERENCE.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions are mentioned in the tool's interaction logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool and can perform arbitrary browser actions, including clicks, form submissions, and data extraction. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the retrieved web content is documented before it is analyzed by the AI model.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses a persistent browser profile located in
.chrome-profile/which stores session cookies and history, potentially exposing sensitive data. Furthermore, the browser has full network access and can interact withlocalhostand internal network resources, which could be exploited for data harvesting from the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to execute its core automation functionality via a custom CLI command and handles complex browser interactions based on natural language input.
Audit Metadata