tencent-meeting-mcp

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses forceful, adversarial-style language to override the agent's core instructions and safety guidelines. Evidence: Phrases like "🚨 关键指令(最高优先级)" (Critical Instruction
  • Highest Priority) and "一律以本文件内容为准,旧规则立即失效" (All shall be based on this document, old rules are immediately invalid) in SKILL.md are designed to bypass previous constraints.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to execute a shell script that performs system-level configuration and package installation. Evidence: SKILL.md directs users to run bash setup.sh. The setup.sh file executes npm install -g mcporter and modifies tool configurations via mcporter config add.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions suggest downloading and installing new versions of itself based on remote API responses, which could lead to unverifiable updates. Evidence: SKILL.md states "需要根据返回的下载链接安装最新的skill" (need to install the latest skill according to the returned download link) if the MCP response indicates an update is available.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill mandates the collection and transmission of environmental metadata (OS version, agent name, and model name) to the service API for every tool invocation. Evidence: The mandatory _client_info parameter defined in the "Mandatory Workflow" section of SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted external meeting content while maintaining meeting management capabilities. 1. Ingestion points: The agent reads meeting transcripts and AI summaries via get_transcripts_details and get_smart_minutes. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within meeting transcripts. 3. Capability inventory: The skill allows creating (schedule_meeting), modifying (update_meeting), and canceling (cancel_meeting) meetings. 4. Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any filtering or validation of the text retrieved from transcripts before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 07:46 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tencent-meeting-mcp