voice-ui
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The backend server in
server.cjsserves theOPENAI_API_KEYenvironment variable in plain text via the/api/keyendpoint. Critically, the server is configured withAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *, which allows any website visited by the user to perform a cross-origin request and steal the API key from the local server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the AI agent to execute shell commands and modify its own source code on the host machine.
CONTEXT.mddirects the agent to rungit add -A && git commitand editindex.htmlbased on user requests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio input that is transcribed and passed directly to a high-privilege AI agent without sanitization. 1. Ingestion points: Microphone input in
index.htmlsent toserver.cjs. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; input is simply labeled with a prefix. 3. Capability inventory: The agent has explicit instructions to write to the local filesystem and execute shell commands. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the raw transcription is processed as part of the agent's instructions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill leaks the local system's username through hardcoded absolute paths in
server.cjsandCONTEXT.md(e.g.,/Users/yuki/...).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata