bggg-tiktok-downloader

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/download_tiktok.py performs dynamic code loading by modifying sys.path to include a directory provided via the TIKTOKDOWNLOADER_ROOT environment variable or the --tiktokdownloader-root argument. It then imports a module (src.link.extractor) from that path. This allows execution of arbitrary Python code from a computed or user-provided directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the external utility yt-dlp using subprocess.run to handle video downloads and metadata extraction.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from tikwm.com (an unofficial TikTok API) and downloads media content from various TikTok-related domains using urllib.request.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted metadata (titles, descriptions, and tags) from TikTok videos and stores them in download_manifest.json without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/download_tiktok.py (via request_json from tikwm.com and read_json from yt-dlp sidecar files).
  • Boundary markers: None. Untrusted strings are placed directly into the JSON manifest.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (yt-dlp), network access (urllib), and file system writes.
  • Sanitization: Filenames are sanitized via regex, but the textual content of titles and descriptions is not filtered for embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 02:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bggg-tiktok-downloader