helios-renderer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an API for rendering web-based compositions from arbitrary URLs, creating a surface where malicious web content could influence the agent's behavior or exploit the rendering environment.
- Ingestion points: The
rendermethod (SKILL.md) ingests untrusted data through thecompositionUrlparameter and theinputPropsobject, which are injected into the browser context. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent the model from obeying instructions embedded within the rendered content.
- Capability inventory: The skill's primary capabilities include file system writes (video output, debug traces), network operations (fetching composition URLs), and subprocess execution (FFmpeg and Playwright).
- Sanitization: There is no mention of URL validation or data sanitization procedures for the provided input properties.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
RendererOptionsinterface allows specifying custom paths for system binaries, which can lead to the execution of arbitrary code if the paths are influenced by an attacker. - Evidence: The configuration options
ffmpegPathandbrowserConfig.executablePathallow the underlying library to execute binaries from user-defined paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's functionality relies on the execution of external tools for media processing.
- Evidence: The documentation describes tools like
concatenateVideosand rendering strategies that internally spawn FFmpeg and Playwright subprocesses to handle video encoding and browser automation.
Audit Metadata