helios-renderer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an API for rendering web-based compositions from arbitrary URLs, creating a surface where malicious web content could influence the agent's behavior or exploit the rendering environment.
  • Ingestion points: The render method (SKILL.md) ingests untrusted data through the compositionUrl parameter and the inputProps object, which are injected into the browser context.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent the model from obeying instructions embedded within the rendered content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's primary capabilities include file system writes (video output, debug traces), network operations (fetching composition URLs), and subprocess execution (FFmpeg and Playwright).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of URL validation or data sanitization procedures for the provided input properties.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The RendererOptions interface allows specifying custom paths for system binaries, which can lead to the execution of arbitrary code if the paths are influenced by an attacker.
  • Evidence: The configuration options ffmpegPath and browserConfig.executablePath allow the underlying library to execute binaries from user-defined paths.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's functionality relies on the execution of external tools for media processing.
  • Evidence: The documentation describes tools like concatenateVideos and rendering strategies that internally spawn FFmpeg and Playwright subprocesses to handle video encoding and browser automation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 28, 2026, 01:45 AM