triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issue bodies, PR comments, and CI failure logs to guide sub-agents in generating code fixes. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface.\n
- Ingestion points: GitHub CLI commands
gh issue list,gh run view --log-failed, andgh issue view --json comments(inSKILL.mdandresources/comment-policy.md).\n - Boundary markers: None identified; untrusted data appears to be passed directly to sub-agents.\n
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents can write to worktrees and execute shell commands (
npm ci,npm test).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is specified before interpolation into agent prompts.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill initiates execution of code generated by sub-agents using
npm ci,npm test, andnpm run buildwithin a git worktree. If the code generation process is compromised via indirect prompt injection, these commands could execute malicious logic embedded in the repository (e.g., viapackage.jsonlifecycle hooks inpackage.json).- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell-based tools (gh,git,npm) to manage the repository and interact with the GitHub API. These commands are executed based on the current state of the repository and findings.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (gh) to transmit information to and from thebitbonsai/mcpvaultrepository. While this is the core functionality, the network access could potentially be misused for exfiltration if the agent's instructions were overridden.
Audit Metadata