docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a process injection technique. It contains a C source code string literal that is written to/tmp/lo_socket_shim.cat runtime, compiled into a shared object usinggcc -shared -fPIC, and subsequently injected into the LibreOffice (soffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is intended to shim Unix domain socket calls for compatibility in restricted environments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs the agent to install thedocxlibrary globally usingnpm install -g docx. This is a standard and well-known library for generating Word documents in JavaScript. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted files:
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to unpack and read content from external Word documents (
scripts/office/unpack.py), which are then converted to XML for analysis and modification. - Boundary markers: While it uses XML structure as a natural delimiter, there are no explicit instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands within the document text itself.
- Capability inventory: The skill has high system capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands (
soffice,gcc,git,pdftoppm) and perform extensive file system operations (found inscripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py, andscripts/office/validators/redlining.py). - Sanitization: The implementation uses
defusedxml.minidomin its validation modules to protect against XML External Entity (XXE) and other XML-based injection attacks.
Audit Metadata