ss-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted user data in file-system operations.\n
- Ingestion points: User input for vibe seeds, context, and file paths is ingested through the
$0,$1, and$ARGUMENTSvariables.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or security markers to help the agent distinguish between user-provided strings and the internal logic of the files being processed.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted access to high-capability tools including
Bash,Edit,Write, andRead, which could be exploited if an attacker provides a malicious file path or command sequence in the arguments.\n - Sanitization: Absent. There is no requirement in the skill instructions for the agent to validate or sanitize the input arguments before using them in shell commands or file modification tasks.
Audit Metadata