auditing-external-claude-plugins

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones third-party Git repositories from user-provided URLs and fetches package metadata, tarballs, and attestations from the npm registry.
  • Evidence: gather-evidence.sh performs git clone on $plugin-repo-url and uses npm view, npm pack, and curl against https://registry.npmjs.org.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes several shell scripts and system tools to gather and process evidence from external sources, including a code beautifier and various binary analysis utilities.
  • Evidence: Uses Bash to run ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/gather-evidence.sh, ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/beautify.sh, grep, jq, file, strings, and shasum.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is specifically designed to ingest and process untrusted third-party code and manifests, which presents an inherent surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the context via git clone and npm pack in gather-evidence.sh (e.g., repo/, pkg/package/).
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions include a robust warning that all gathered data is to be analyzed and never followed as instructions, specifically directing the agent to report any detected adversarial instructions as critical findings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities via Bash (limited to scripts and specific tools), file system access via Read and Write, and the ability to trigger other security analysis skills.
  • Sanitization: The skill proactively neutralizes potential attacks by disabling symlinks during cloning (core.symlinks=false), recording and removing symlinks in packages, and beautifying minified files to ensure readable code for analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 11:59 AM