auditing-external-claude-plugins
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones third-party Git repositories from user-provided URLs and fetches package metadata, tarballs, and attestations from the npm registry.
- Evidence:
gather-evidence.shperformsgit cloneon$plugin-repo-urland usesnpm view,npm pack, andcurlagainsthttps://registry.npmjs.org. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes several shell scripts and system tools to gather and process evidence from external sources, including a code beautifier and various binary analysis utilities.
- Evidence: Uses
Bashto run${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/gather-evidence.sh,${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/beautify.sh,grep,jq,file,strings, andshasum. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is specifically designed to ingest and process untrusted third-party code and manifests, which presents an inherent surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the context via
git cloneandnpm packingather-evidence.sh(e.g.,repo/,pkg/package/). - Boundary markers: The skill instructions include a robust warning that all gathered data is to be analyzed and never followed as instructions, specifically directing the agent to report any detected adversarial instructions as critical findings.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities via
Bash(limited to scripts and specific tools), file system access viaReadandWrite, and the ability to trigger other security analysis skills. - Sanitization: The skill proactively neutralizes potential attacks by disabling symlinks during cloning (
core.symlinks=false), recording and removing symlinks in packages, and beautifying minified files to ensure readable code for analysis.
Audit Metadata