new-album
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable to define album names and genres. While instructions suggest converting inputs to slugs, there are no explicit boundary markers or strict validation logic within the prompt to prevent a user from providing malicious strings that could attempt to influence the agent's logic or the underlying tool's behavior. - Ingestion points: User input provided through
$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the arguments are parsed directly into variables.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andbitwize-music-mcp(a vendor-specific tool) in itsallowed-toolslist, enabling file system and command-line operations. - Sanitization: The instructions mention using "slug form" (lowercase, hyphenated), but the enforcement relies on the model's interpretation rather than programmatic validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly allows the use of the
Bashtool and provides examples of shell commands (e.g.,mkdir,cp) in the "Common Mistakes" section. The combination of shell access and processing user-controlled input (album names and genres) creates a surface for potential command injection if the inputs are not handled carefully by the agent or the underlying system.
Audit Metadata