skills/bjesuiter/skills/jb-worktree/Gen Agent Trust Hub

jb-worktree

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read and utilize .wtp.yml configuration files located within repositories. If an agent processes a malicious repository, these files could contain shell hooks or instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior or execute unwanted actions during the worktree setup process.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads .wtp.yml from the repository root (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to treat the contents of .wtp.yml as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses wtp exec and shell commands via post_create hooks, allowing for arbitrary command execution.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the commands defined in the configuration files.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of lifecycle hooks (post_create) within the .wtp.yml file, which allows for the automatic execution of shell commands when a new worktree is created. It also provides patterns for shell integration using eval to initialize the wtp environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the wtp CLI and standard Git commands to manage worktrees. It provides the agent with the ability to run arbitrary user-specified or config-specified commands inside a worktree via wtp exec <name> -- <command>.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing the wtp binary from external sources, including a Homebrew tap (satococoa/tap/wtp) and a Go package registry targeting a GitHub repository (github.com/satococoa/wtp/v2/cmd/wtp@latest).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 09:40 AM