jb-worktree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read and utilize
.wtp.ymlconfiguration files located within repositories. If an agent processes a malicious repository, these files could contain shell hooks or instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior or execute unwanted actions during the worktree setup process. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
.wtp.ymlfrom the repository root (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to treat the contents of
.wtp.ymlas untrusted. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
wtp execand shell commands viapost_createhooks, allowing for arbitrary command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the commands defined in the configuration files.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of lifecycle hooks (
post_create) within the.wtp.ymlfile, which allows for the automatic execution of shell commands when a new worktree is created. It also provides patterns for shell integration usingevalto initialize thewtpenvironment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
wtpCLI and standard Git commands to manage worktrees. It provides the agent with the ability to run arbitrary user-specified or config-specified commands inside a worktree viawtp exec <name> -- <command>. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing the
wtpbinary from external sources, including a Homebrew tap (satococoa/tap/wtp) and a Go package registry targeting a GitHub repository (github.com/satococoa/wtp/v2/cmd/wtp@latest).
Audit Metadata