decision-log
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates autonomous execution and explicitly instructs the agent to bypass user confirmation for file operations. Directives like 'Do NOT ask the user which decisions to log' and 'Do NOT present candidates for confirmation' eliminate human oversight during the creation and modification of files in the local directory.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted conversation data into persistent files.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions (SKILL.md) require scanning the full conversation history for decisions.
- Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the conversation text.
- Capability inventory: The agent writes files to the
decisions/directory and regenerates an index file. - Sanitization: The instructions focus on redacting secrets but do not provide guidance on validating or escaping the content of extracted decisions to prevent command or prompt injection.
Audit Metadata