codex-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely built around the execution of the
codexcommand-line tool via Bash. It provides specific templates for invokingcodex execwith varying reasoning efforts and sandbox permissions, includingworkspace-writecapabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the transfer of task data and instructions to a sub-agent. This process lacks explicit sanitization or boundary markers between user-controlled task data and the resulting command-line prompts.
- Ingestion points: Task objectives, scope definitions, and context are ingested into the
codex execprompt argument as seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
codextool which, according to the instructions, can be grantedworkspace-writepermissions, allowing it to modify files in the repository. - Sanitization: There are no documented steps for escaping or validating the content of the self-contained prompts before they are passed to the shell.
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