codex-delegate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely built around the execution of the codex command-line tool via Bash. It provides specific templates for invoking codex exec with varying reasoning efforts and sandbox permissions, including workspace-write capabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the transfer of task data and instructions to a sub-agent. This process lacks explicit sanitization or boundary markers between user-controlled task data and the resulting command-line prompts.
  • Ingestion points: Task objectives, scope definitions, and context are ingested into the codex exec prompt argument as seen in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the codex tool which, according to the instructions, can be granted workspace-write permissions, allowing it to modify files in the repository.
  • Sanitization: There are no documented steps for escaping or validating the content of the self-contained prompts before they are passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 01:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codex-delegate