fan-out
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates a multi-agent workflow where a parent agent processes evidence from subagents that ingest potentially untrusted repository content, introducing a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Subagents are instructed to scan the repository using
Read,Grep, andGlobtools as defined in the role stubs inreferences/agent-templates.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill mandates that subagents start with no parent transcript history ("subagents inherit NO parent transcript") to limit context exposure, as specified in
SKILL.md.\n - Capability inventory: Depending on the role, agents have access to
Bash,Edit, andWritetools.\n - Sanitization: The instructions require the parent agent to manually synthesize returns and resolve conflicts between agents, providing a human-in-the-loop oversight mechanism.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided templates grant subagents access to the
Bashtool for repository searching and verification tasks.\n - Evidence: The role definitions for
repo-explorer,reviewer, andimplementation-workerinreferences/agent-templates.mdexplicitly include theBashtool in their tool sets to support inventory scans and test execution.
Audit Metadata