multi-model-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses codex exec to run shell commands in a background process (specifically a bash loop) to collect git diffs and perform analysis. This pattern involves executing shell commands with a 600-second timeout to handle repository operations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes advanced defensive patterns against indirect prompt injection in the adversarial-prompt.md template. It explicitly defines <untrusted_content_rules> that instruct the model to treat all repository data (diffs, comments, messages) as data rather than instructions, and to flag any behavior-altering text as an injection finding itself.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Phase 1, the Opus lane is granted shell access to collect repository data. The skill documentation explicitly notes that 'read-only-ness' is enforced by prompt compliance rather than tool-level sandboxing, creating a reliance on the model's adherence to instructions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external, untrusted repository content (git diff, file reads) and interpolates it directly into prompts via placeholders like {{REVIEW_INPUT}}. While vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, the risk is mitigated by the inclusion of clear boundary markers (<repository_context>) and the aforementioned adversarial grounding rules.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill requires an absolute repository path (repo) and accesses local files to generate a diff and perform code reviews. While this exposes source code to the configured models (e.g., GPT-5.6-terra, Claude Opus), the purpose of the skill is inherently centered on these files, and it does not demonstrate patterns of exfiltrating data to external domains.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 01:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — multi-model-review