graphify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to install a Python package named
graphifyyviapip. The name differs from the skill namegraphify, which is a common indicator of a non-standard or potentially suspicious dependency. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes multiple mechanisms to maintain persistence and influence future agent behavior:
- The
graphify hook installcommand installs a git post-commit hook that executes code automatically after every commit. - The
native Agent integrationinstructions append rules toCLAUDE.md,GEMINI.md, andAGENTS.mdto permanently alter how agents interact with the project. - The
--watchflag starts a background process to monitor file changes and trigger re-extractions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes arbitrary data from a variety of sources, creating a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Processes any files in a folder (code, docs, papers, images, videos) and fetches remote content from URLs via the
/graphify addcommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions for subagents lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings, increasing the risk that the subagent will follow instructions hidden in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: Subagents are explicitly required to be
general-purpose, granting them access toWriteandBashtools. The main skill also performs file system writes and network operations (ingest,push_to_neo4j). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content ingested from local files or external URLs before it is processed by the AI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution to manage the environment, including detecting Python interpreters, installing packages with
--break-system-packages, and writing configuration files to the file system.
Audit Metadata