skills/black12-ag/claude-skill/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts natural language content from user-provided presentation files, which may contain instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior.\n
  • Ingestion points: Slide text is extracted in scripts/inventory.py and converted to markdown using the markitdown tool as described in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill's instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide warnings for the agent to disregard instructions embedded within presentation text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run (in pack.py, thumbnail.py, and redlining.py) and perform extensive file system modifications.\n
  • Sanitization: Extracted slide content is passed back to the agent's context without filtering or sanitization.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external binaries to perform document conversion, validation, and comparison tasks.\n
  • Evidence: ooxml/scripts/pack.py and scripts/thumbnail.py call soffice (LibreOffice). scripts/thumbnail.py also utilizes pdftoppm for thumbnail generation. ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py uses git diff for comparing XML versions.\n
  • Context: These calls are implemented using list-based argument passing, which is safe from shell injection, and they are essential for the skill's primary functionality of presentation management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 02:57 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx