requesting-code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and the review template utilize shell commands such as
git rev-parse,git log, andgit diffto identify changes within a repository. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
code-reviewer.md, shell commands are constructed by interpolating variables like{BASE_SHA}and{HEAD_SHA}into agit diffcommand. This creates a surface for command injection if the variables, derived from branch names or user input, contain shell metacharacters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The subagent is tasked with reviewing code and requirements, which are external data sources that could contain adversarial content designed to mislead the reviewer or override its instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED}and{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}placeholders, as well as the output of thegit diffcommand incode-reviewer.md. - Boundary markers: The template lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the interpolated content as potentially untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The subagent has access to the local filesystem and the ability to execute git commands via the shell.
- Sanitization: No mechanisms for validation, filtering, or escaping are present to process the inputs before they are included in the prompt or executed.
Audit Metadata