requesting-code-review

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and the review template utilize shell commands such as git rev-parse, git log, and git diff to identify changes within a repository.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In code-reviewer.md, shell commands are constructed by interpolating variables like {BASE_SHA} and {HEAD_SHA} into a git diff command. This creates a surface for command injection if the variables, derived from branch names or user input, contain shell metacharacters.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The subagent is tasked with reviewing code and requirements, which are external data sources that could contain adversarial content designed to mislead the reviewer or override its instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED} and {PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS} placeholders, as well as the output of the git diff command in code-reviewer.md.
  • Boundary markers: The template lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the interpolated content as potentially untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The subagent has access to the local filesystem and the ability to execute git commands via the shell.
  • Sanitization: No mechanisms for validation, filtering, or escaping are present to process the inputs before they are included in the prompt or executed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 02:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — requesting-code-review