credential-recovery

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute core tools like hashcat and john with the dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true flag, which bypasses the execution environment's security controls.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of sudo to perform administrative tasks such as installing the john, wordlists, and seclists packages.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a potential for command injection as the skill constructs shell commands (e.g., zip2john protected.zip > hash.txt) using user-supplied file paths and filenames without explicit sanitization or escaping.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Risk of indirect prompt injection through data ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from password hashes and encrypted archives provided by the user or other skills.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the data being processed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool with broad permissions (dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true) for tool execution and file manipulation.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not mention validation or escaping of the ingested hash data or archive filenames before passing them to the shell.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches software source code from the official Openwall repository on GitHub for building the John the Ripper tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 6, 2026, 09:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — credential-recovery