credential-recovery
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute core tools like
hashcatandjohnwith thedangerouslyDisableSandbox: trueflag, which bypasses the execution environment's security controls. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of
sudoto perform administrative tasks such as installing thejohn,wordlists, andseclistspackages. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a potential for command injection as the skill constructs shell commands (e.g.,
zip2john protected.zip > hash.txt) using user-supplied file paths and filenames without explicit sanitization or escaping. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Risk of indirect prompt injection through data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from password hashes and encrypted archives provided by the user or other skills.
- Boundary markers: None identified; the skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool with broad permissions (dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true) for tool execution and file manipulation. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not mention validation or escaping of the ingested hash data or archive filenames before passing them to the shell.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches software source code from the official Openwall repository on GitHub for building the John the Ripper tool.
Audit Metadata