password-spraying
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a Bash script (
engagement/evidence/spray-runner.sh) by interpolating variables such as target IPs, domains, and service lists provided by the orchestrator. This script is then executed in a single shot using theBashtool. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Troubleshooting instructions advise the use of
sudo ntpdateorsudo rdateto resolve Kerberos clock skew issues, which requires the agent to attempt commands with elevated privileges. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly utilizes
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=truewhen executing its generated spray script via theBashtool to allow for extended execution times (up to 10 minutes) and background processing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from the orchestrator (usernames, target services, and IPs) and directly interpolating them into a generated shell script without explicit sanitization or validation logic.
- Ingestion points: Usernames and targets are passed via the agent prompt from the orchestrator.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the script generation template.
- Capability inventory: File-write (
Writetool) and shell execution (Bashtool). - Sanitization: No visible escaping or validation for shell metacharacters in the interpolated variables.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The core purpose of the skill is the discovery and handling of credentials. It instructs the agent to save valid credentials to local files (e.g.,
engagement/evidence/spray-results.txt) and manage them via an MCP state server.
Audit Metadata