retrospective
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell command to update the skill index after modifications:
uv run --directory tools/skill-router python indexer.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses untrusted subagent logs (
*.jsonl) that contain raw tool outputs and reasoning steps from previous engagements. These logs could potentially contain malicious payloads or instructions from a compromised target. - Ingestion points:
engagement/evidence/logs/*.jsonl,engagement/scope.md, andengagement/state.db. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the
skills/andagents/directories and execute shell commands viauv run. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the subagent tasked with parsing the logs, relying on the subagent's general-purpose prompt.
- Sanitization: While manual "CTF sanitization" is mentioned for the final output, there is no automated sanitization of the log data during the parsing phase.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill automates the creation and modification of other skill definitions (
SKILL.md) and agent templates based on analyzed engagement data, effectively modifying the agent's logic for future sessions.
Audit Metadata