retrospective

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell command to update the skill index after modifications: uv run --directory tools/skill-router python indexer.py.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses untrusted subagent logs (*.jsonl) that contain raw tool outputs and reasoning steps from previous engagements. These logs could potentially contain malicious payloads or instructions from a compromised target.
  • Ingestion points: engagement/evidence/logs/*.jsonl, engagement/scope.md, and engagement/state.db.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the skills/ and agents/ directories and execute shell commands via uv run.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the subagent tasked with parsing the logs, relying on the subagent's general-purpose prompt.
  • Sanitization: While manual "CTF sanitization" is mentioned for the final output, there is no automated sanitization of the log data during the parsing phase.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill automates the creation and modification of other skill definitions (SKILL.md) and agent templates based on analyzed engagement data, effectively modifying the agent's logic for future sessions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 03:47 PM