sccm-exploitation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Modifies the system's /etc/hosts file to add DNS entries for target infrastructure, which is a sensitive system configuration change.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Accesses highly sensitive system files and data stores, including the Windows WMI repository (OBJECTS.DATA) and Kerberos credential caches (.ccache files).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes powerful offensive security tools such as ntlmrelayx.py, PetitPotam.py, and Mimikatz to perform authentication coercion, credential relaying, and secret harvesting.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Performs large-scale harvesting of sensitive credentials from SCCM infrastructure, including Network Access Account (NAA) credentials and OSD task sequence secrets.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Includes hardcoded placeholder credentials (e.g., 'Password123', 'Password123!') in command-line examples for authentication and machine account creation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion and processing of untrusted data from network-accessible SCCM management points (XML policy files and HTTP responses) without boundary markers or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches XML policy data via sccmwtf.py and retrieves site information from Management Point HTTP endpoints.
  • Boundary markers: Lacks delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting embedded data as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Has extensive access to shell execution, file system operations, and network tools.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of data validation, escaping, or filtering for ingested content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 6, 2026, 09:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sccm-exploitation