expo-cicd-workflows-v55

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions to execute an external package named submit-expo-feedback via npx. This package is not hosted under an official organization namespace (e.g., @expo/) and is requested with the @latest tag, which allows for the dynamic download and execution of unverified third-party code.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes a local utility script scripts/fetch.js to retrieve documentation and schema files from the Expo service's official domains. While the intended use targets reputable sources, the script is a general-purpose HTTP client that allows the agent to fetch content from any arbitrary URL, which could facilitate the ingestion of untrusted data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is instructed to fetch and follow content from external JSON schemas and Markdown documentation to generate and validate workflow files.
  • Ingestion points: The agent retrieves resources from api.expo.dev and github.com/expo using the fetch.js script to guide its output (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the fetched content as untrusted data or to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system operations (Read/Write) and shell command execution via Node.js and npx for various CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the fetched external content before it is used to influence the agent's logic or file generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 10:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — expo-cicd-workflows-v55