expo-cicd-workflows-v55
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions to execute an external package named
submit-expo-feedbackvianpx. This package is not hosted under an official organization namespace (e.g.,@expo/) and is requested with the@latesttag, which allows for the dynamic download and execution of unverified third-party code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes a local utility script
scripts/fetch.jsto retrieve documentation and schema files from the Expo service's official domains. While the intended use targets reputable sources, the script is a general-purpose HTTP client that allows the agent to fetch content from any arbitrary URL, which could facilitate the ingestion of untrusted data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is instructed to fetch and follow content from external JSON schemas and Markdown documentation to generate and validate workflow files.
- Ingestion points: The agent retrieves resources from
api.expo.devandgithub.com/expousing thefetch.jsscript to guide its output (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the fetched content as untrusted data or to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system operations (Read/Write) and shell command execution via Node.js and
npxfor various CLI tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the fetched external content before it is used to influence the agent's logic or file generation.
Audit Metadata