react-email
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of email templates that ingest and render untrusted user data (e.g.,
name,orderNumber). This represents a vulnerability surface where malicious input could attempt to influence the agent's output or perform cross-site scripting (XSS) if the resulting HTML is rendered in an insecure context. - Ingestion points: Component props in
SKILL.md,references/I18N.md, andreferences/PATTERNS.md(e.g.,WelcomeEmailProps,OrderConfirmationProps,NotificationProps). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify using delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the template data strings at runtime.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
renderfunction fromreact-emailto generate HTML/Text and provides examples for sending via various email providers' APIs (resend,nodemailer,mailgun.js,sgMail). - Sanitization: Absent. While React's JSX provides default escaping for HTML, the skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to sanitize inputs for plain-text rendering or to validate the structure of ingested data to prevent data-driven attacks.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: A discrepancy exists between the provided author context ("blockmatic") and the manifest in
SKILL.md, which lists "Resend" as the author. While all provided links are to legitimateresend.comandreact.emailresources, such inconsistencies in reported provenance can be deceptive and may hinder accurate supply-chain auditing.
Audit Metadata