assess-me
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read sensitive local data, specifically session transcripts and history from various AI agent tools such as Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor.
- It accesses sensitive paths including
~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/history.jsonl,~/.cursor/prompt_history.json, and~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db. - While no network exfiltration is present in the provided scripts, these logs can contain sensitive user information, including credentials, tokens, or private code shared in previous sessions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilize
subprocess.run()to execute local tools and helpers. scripts/collect.pyinvokes other local Python scripts to aggregate data.scripts/git_stats.pyexecutes thegitcommand-line tool to mine contribution statistics (e.g.,git log,git config).- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes historical transcript data and git logs, which serves as a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can poison the user's history.
- Ingestion points: Local JSONL and SQLite files containing user prompts and git commit messages are processed by
scripts/extract_prompts.pyandscripts/git_stats.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate ingested data from the agent's context in the final report.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system read/write capabilities and the ability to execute shell commands via
git. - Sanitization: Basic text filtering is performed (e.g., an
is_prosecheck that filters out tool results and system markers), but it does not perform robust validation against adversarial instructions embedded in the history.
Audit Metadata