skills/blowmage/reins/assess-me/Gen Agent Trust Hub

assess-me

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local application directories to read conversation transcripts and session history from various coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi). Accessed paths include ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.cursor/prompt_history.json, ~/.codex/history.jsonl, and others in the user's home directory. This represents a significant exposure of private user interaction data.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: \n
  • Ingestion points: User-generated prose and prompts are extracted directly from local agent transcript files and databases by scripts/extract_prompts.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions for synthesizing the assessment and writing the report letter do not specify the use of strict delimiters or protective markers when processing the extracted transcript content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read local files, write assessment reports to the filesystem, and execute shell commands via subprocesses.\n
  • Sanitization: No content sanitization or filtering of potential malicious instructions within the extracted transcript prose is performed before processing by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts collect.py and git_stats.py utilize subprocess.run to execute local system commands, including python3 for script orchestration and git for mining contribution statistics from local repositories.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — assess-me