assess-me
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local application directories to read conversation transcripts and session history from various coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi). Accessed paths include
~/.claude/projects/,~/.cursor/prompt_history.json,~/.codex/history.jsonl, and others in the user's home directory. This represents a significant exposure of private user interaction data.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: \n - Ingestion points: User-generated prose and prompts are extracted directly from local agent transcript files and databases by
scripts/extract_prompts.py.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions for synthesizing the assessment and writing the report letter do not specify the use of strict delimiters or protective markers when processing the extracted transcript content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read local files, write assessment reports to the filesystem, and execute shell commands via subprocesses.\n
- Sanitization: No content sanitization or filtering of potential malicious instructions within the extracted transcript prose is performed before processing by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
collect.pyandgit_stats.pyutilizesubprocess.runto execute local system commands, includingpython3for script orchestration andgitfor mining contribution statistics from local repositories.
Audit Metadata