internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large volumes of unstructured data from Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar events to summarize internal updates, newsletters, and FAQs. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from Slack messages, Google Drive documents, emails, and calendar attachments as described in examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between the system's instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the agent's core capabilities to read external data and format it into user-facing communications. While it does not explicitly call shell commands or write files in the provided scripts, the formatted output could be used to influence subsequent agent actions in a tool-chaining scenario.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content pulled from these external sources before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 05:46 AM