internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large volumes of unstructured data from Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar events to summarize internal updates, newsletters, and FAQs. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from Slack messages, Google Drive documents, emails, and calendar attachments as described in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between the system's instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the agent's core capabilities to read external data and format it into user-facing communications. While it does not explicitly call shell commands or write files in the provided scripts, the formatted output could be used to influence subsequent agent actions in a tool-chaining scenario.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content pulled from these external sources before it is processed by the LLM.
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