brand
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjsutilizeschild_process.execSyncto run a Node.js script located at.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/generate-tokens.cjs. Executing local scripts via shell commands using hardcoded or relative paths can be a security concern if the filesystem structure is manipulated or if the target script is compromised. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains logic that could lead to unauthorized file exposure. The routing mechanism described in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to load files based on the first word of the$ARGUMENTSvariable (pattern:references/{subcommand}.md) without explicit path sanitization, which could be exploited for path traversal. Furthermore, thescripts/inject-brand-context.cjsscript accepts a file path as a command-line argument and reads its content usingfs.readFileSyncwithout performing path validation, potentially exposing sensitive files to the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external and untrusted data, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/validate-asset.cjs(marketing assets),scripts/extract-colors.cjs(images), andscripts/inject-brand-context.cjs(markdown guidelines). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or markers to separate untrusted content from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill scripts have the capability to read files from the filesystem (
fs.readFileSync) and execute shell commands (child_process.execSyncvia the sync utility). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external file content before it is processed or presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata