skills/blunotech-dev/agents/brand/Gen Agent Trust Hub

brand

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs utilizes child_process.execSync to run a Node.js script located at .claude/skills/design-system/scripts/generate-tokens.cjs. Executing local scripts via shell commands using hardcoded or relative paths can be a security concern if the filesystem structure is manipulated or if the target script is compromised.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains logic that could lead to unauthorized file exposure. The routing mechanism described in SKILL.md instructs the agent to load files based on the first word of the $ARGUMENTS variable (pattern: references/{subcommand}.md) without explicit path sanitization, which could be exploited for path traversal. Furthermore, the scripts/inject-brand-context.cjs script accepts a file path as a command-line argument and reads its content using fs.readFileSync without performing path validation, potentially exposing sensitive files to the agent context.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external and untrusted data, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/validate-asset.cjs (marketing assets), scripts/extract-colors.cjs (images), and scripts/inject-brand-context.cjs (markdown guidelines).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or markers to separate untrusted content from the system prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill scripts have the capability to read files from the filesystem (fs.readFileSync) and execute shell commands (child_process.execSync via the sync utility).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external file content before it is processed or presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 07:43 AM