skill-forge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform workspace discovery, directory traversal, and complex file management logic as part of its internal workflow. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Step 4.2 involves a script validation phase where the agent executes a 'smoke test' (
--help) on scripts synthesized from untrusted web content. Executing code derived from external sources, even with restricted flags, presents a risk of exploiting argument parsing vulnerabilities or unintended side effects in the generated logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes data from web searches and third-party skills to synthesize new instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
WebSearch,WebFetch, and by reading existing third-partySKILL.mdfiles from the local filesystem. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate wrapping untrusted inputs (
topicandtask_context) in tags to distinguish data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash(command execution),Write(file creation), andAgent(dispatching subagents) across its scripts. - Sanitization: Mitigations include the use of an
external-content-sanitizer, adescription-injection guard, a portability check to remove sensitive project/agent names from output, and a mandatory multi-cycle self-review loop.
Audit Metadata