bmad-agent-sentinel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is designed to maintain a persistent 'sanctum' by recording session logs and distilling them into long-term memory. This process involves processing potentially untrusted data from conversation history without explicit sanitization or boundary markers, which could allow adversarial input to influence future agent logic.
- Ingestion points: Raw session logs stored in
sessions/and curated intoMEMORY.mdduring autonomous Pulse sessions. - Boundary markers: None; the agent relies on its own distillation logic and character persona to manage memory without specific delimiters for user-provided data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via
uv runand has write access to its sanctum directory to store memory and new scripts. - Sanitization: No automated sanitization of log content prior to curation is detailed in the templates.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The 'Capability Authoring' guide (
references/capability-authoring.md) instructs the agent to expand its functionality by writing Python or bash scripts to thecapabilities/directory. These agent-generated scripts are then executed to perform deterministic tasks, facilitating dynamic code generation and execution within the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of initialization and runtime scripts (
scripts/init-sanctum.pyandscripts/wake.py) to manage the agent's identity and state transitions. These commands are executed locally using theuvenvironment during skill activation.
Audit Metadata