bmad-testarch-nfr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
uv runto invoke a customization resolver script (resolve_customization.py) located in the project's_bmad/scripts/directory. This occurs during skill activation and validation steps. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves running
playwright-clito perform live browser-based evidence collection, such as monitoring network traffic and capturing screenshots of target URLs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its core purpose is to ingest and analyze untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project-level artifacts including
tech-spec.md,PRD.md, story files, and various evidence sources like logs and test results (e.g., insteps-c/step-01-load-context.mdandsteps-c/step-03-gather-evidence.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the content of these external files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to file system tools (
read_file,write_file,list_files,search_repo,glob) and command execution capabilities (uv,playwright-cli). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from the audited documents before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata