bmad-build-auto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its architecture of ingesting external data to drive autonomous decisions.
- Ingestion points: The workflow in
step-01-clarify-and-route.mdandstep-02-plan.mdloadsstories.yaml, epic specification files, and planning artifacts (e.g., PRDs, architecture, and UX documents). Additionally,step-04-review.mdprocesses code diffs and narrative claims. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structural tags like
<intent-contract>and explicit natural language instructions (e.g., instep-03-implement.mdandreferences/claims-check.md) to limit the agent's attention to specific sections of ingested files. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands through the
uv runcommand inSKILL.mdand manage repository state via Git. It also orchestrates subagents that have the capability to modify source code and run project-specific verification checks. - Sanitization: The skill relies on formatting and context isolation rather than programmatic sanitization or escaping of external inputs before they are included in prompts for reviewer or implementer subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The primary instruction in
SKILL.mddirects the execution of a shell command (uv run --no-cache "{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/render_skill.py"). This allows the agent to execute a Python script located within the user's project directory.
Audit Metadata