bmad-code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several shell commands including
uv runto execute project-local scripts, andgitandghfor context gathering. It also suggests usingnpxto install the 'bmad' skill framework if it is missing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies on dynamically rendering and following step files. Specifically, it executes
render_skill.pyfrom a path determined at runtime within the project's root directory (_bmad/scripts/), which could allow a malicious repository to execute arbitrary code during the review process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include a command to install the
bmadframework from the vendor's GitHub repository (bmad-code-org/BMAD-METHOD) usingnpx. This resource belongs to the skill's official author. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data such as code diffs and PR descriptions as input for review subagents.
- Ingestion points: Reads project diffs, claims files, and plan documents from the local environment or via
gh pr view. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates for subagents use structural markers and explicit instruction headers to delimit content.
- Capability inventory: The main agent has command execution and file access capabilities, while subagents are explicitly restricted from invoking additional skills.
- Sanitization: A mandatory triage step requires the main agent to verify subagent findings against the codebase before presenting them to the user.
Audit Metadata