bmad-code-review

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several shell commands including uv run to execute project-local scripts, and git and gh for context gathering. It also suggests using npx to install the 'bmad' skill framework if it is missing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies on dynamically rendering and following step files. Specifically, it executes render_skill.py from a path determined at runtime within the project's root directory (_bmad/scripts/), which could allow a malicious repository to execute arbitrary code during the review process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include a command to install the bmad framework from the vendor's GitHub repository (bmad-code-org/BMAD-METHOD) using npx. This resource belongs to the skill's official author.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data such as code diffs and PR descriptions as input for review subagents.
  • Ingestion points: Reads project diffs, claims files, and plan documents from the local environment or via gh pr view.
  • Boundary markers: Prompt templates for subagents use structural markers and explicit instruction headers to delimit content.
  • Capability inventory: The main agent has command execution and file access capabilities, while subagents are explicitly restricted from invoking additional skills.
  • Sanitization: A mandatory triage step requires the main agent to verify subagent findings against the codebase before presenting them to the user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 10:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bmad-code-review