bmad-forge-idea
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute arbitrary instruction sequences defined in the
customize.tomlfile under theactivation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_completekeys. This allows for the execution of unvalidated commands at multiple stages of the skill's operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/resolve_personas.pyscript uses thesubprocess.runfunction to execute other Python scripts (resolve_config.pyandresolve_customization.py). The paths to these scripts are dynamically constructed relative to the project root, which is a significant capability for running external logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests 'project files and materials' to validate user claims and drive the forge process. This untrusted data enters the agent's context and influences reasoning and script-based state updates (via
memlog.py), creating a potential injection surface. - Ingestion points: The 'Discover intent' and 'The forge' sections in
SKILL.mddescribe reading external project materials. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security headers to isolate content from these external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files (
forged-idea.md,forge-report.html), maintain state via a local database script (memlog.py), and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or escaping for the data ingested from project materials before it is processed by the agent.
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