bmad-forge-idea

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute arbitrary instruction sequences defined in the customize.toml file under the activation_steps_prepend, activation_steps_append, and on_complete keys. This allows for the execution of unvalidated commands at multiple stages of the skill's operation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/resolve_personas.py script uses the subprocess.run function to execute other Python scripts (resolve_config.py and resolve_customization.py). The paths to these scripts are dynamically constructed relative to the project root, which is a significant capability for running external logic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests 'project files and materials' to validate user claims and drive the forge process. This untrusted data enters the agent's context and influences reasoning and script-based state updates (via memlog.py), creating a potential injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: The 'Discover intent' and 'The forge' sections in SKILL.md describe reading external project materials.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security headers to isolate content from these external files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files (forged-idea.md, forge-report.html), maintain state via a local database script (memlog.py), and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or escaping for the data ingested from project materials before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 6, 2026, 06:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bmad-forge-idea