bmad-forge-idea
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runandsubprocess.runto execute local Python scripts (such asresolve_customization.py,resolve_config.py,memlog.py, androster.py) that are part of the BMad ecosystem. These executions are used to resolve configurations and maintain session state on disk. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multipleuv runcommands targeting scripts in the{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/directory. - Evidence:
scripts/resolve_personas.pyusessubprocess.runto call other BMad utility scripts using the current Python interpreter. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions by ingesting user-provided ideas and existing project materials to facilitate a questioning session. This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data being processed.
- Ingestion points: User ideas and goals provided during activation in
SKILL.md, project files and materials referenced inSKILL.mdunder 'The forge', and existing.memlog.mdfiles read during the 'On Activation' sequence. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly define delimiters or provide 'ignore instructions' warnings when processing external project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read from the filesystem (globbing and reading memlogs), write session logs and HTML reports, and execute local BMad management scripts through the command line.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping mechanisms are described for user-provided ideas before they are passed to the
memlog.pyutility or included in the agent's reasoning context.
Audit Metadata