bmad-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute external Python scripts, includingword_metrics.py(distributed with the skill) andresolve_customization.py(expected in the project root). It also supportsactivation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_completeconfiguration hooks that execute literal instructions provided incustomize.tomlor user-defined override files. This mechanism allows project-level configuration to define and execute arbitrary agent behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, which is a primary surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
content(diffs, branches, files) andclaims(commit messages) supplied by the user or project environment. - Boundary markers: The skill provides specific instructions to subagents to "Return ONLY your findings" and forbids them from invoking other skills, which serves as a security boundary.
- Capability inventory: The execution environment includes shell command execution via
uv run, the ability to write files to user-defined paths (report_path), and the capability to spawn subagents. - Sanitization: The skill stages content as temporary files, but there is no explicit mention of sanitizing or escaping the content to prevent instructions within the content from influencing the reviewing subagents.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive project information, including full source files, unified diffs, and test files. It can write collected findings and reports to a persistent file specified by the
report_pathconfiguration field.
Audit Metadata