bmad-cis-agent-design-thinking-coach

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script via uv run at the path {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py. This pattern allows the execution of arbitrary shell commands within the project environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions mandate the execution of entries within {agent.activation_steps_prepend}, {agent.activation_steps_append}, and the {agent.menu}. Because these fields are populated from configuration files (customize.toml and potential overrides), an attacker who can modify these files can inject and execute arbitrary commands or instructions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface by ingesting external data into its operational context:
  • Ingestion points: Data is loaded from customize.toml, team overrides in _bmad/custom/, user overrides, and arbitrary files specified via persistent_facts glob patterns.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content within the ingested files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute shell commands (uv run), dynamically execute activation steps, and perform file system reads.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from these external files before it is processed or executed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 04:55 AM