gds-agent-game-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a Python script using
uv runduring activation (resolve_customization.py). It also executes arbitrary "activation steps" defined in theagentconfiguration block (activation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's activation logic dynamically merges and executes instructions from external
.tomlconfiguration files located in the project root (_bmad/custom/). This allows for runtime modification of the agent's execution flow based on files that can be modified by other processes or users in the environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data from multiple external sources to define its persona and knowledge base.
- Ingestion points: Project configuration files (
config.yaml), team/user overrides (.toml), and local files referenced viafile:globs inpersistent_facts. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are applied to the content loaded from these files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for shell command execution, file system access, and skill dispatching.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the instructions loaded from the
activation_stepsorpersistent_factsarrays.
Audit Metadata