gds-agent-game-architect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is instructed to execute entries in
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_appendfound in the agent configuration. This configuration is merged from multiple sources including local project files, allowing for arbitrary command execution if these files are compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Upon activation, the skill runs a local Python script
resolve_customization.pyusing theuvtool. The script is located within the{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/directory, which is associated with the skill vendor's namespace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes configuration data from local files which can influence agent behavior and command execution.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads configuration from
customize.toml,{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.toml,{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.user.toml, and{project-root}/_bmad/gds/config.yaml. It also loads file content based on thepersistent_factsconfiguration. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters are defined for the imported configuration data or facts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
activation_steps_prepend/appendanduv run, and it can read files via thepersistent_factsmechanism. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the configuration entries or file content is performed before execution or ingestion into the persona context.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
persistent_factsconfiguration field allows for the loading of file contents (viafile:prefixes) or globs into the agent's session context. This capability can be used to read sensitive project files if the configuration is altered by a local attacker.
Audit Metadata