gds-agent-game-designer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script using
uv runto resolve its activation configuration. This occurs inSKILL.mdat Step 1:uv run {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is instructed to iterate through and execute arbitrary steps defined in the
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_appendarrays withincustomize.tomland its overrides. While the defaults are empty, this mechanism allows for the execution of arbitrary instructions or actions provided by external configuration files at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it derives its persona, role, and core instructions from external project files.
- Ingestion points: Configuration is read from
SKILL.md(Step 1 and 5) viacustomize.toml,{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.toml, and{project-root}/_bmad/gds/config.yaml. Additionally, Step 4 loads arbitrary files from the project root specified inpersistent_facts. - Boundary markers: None. The skill instructs the agent to treat configuration entries as foundational facts and to execute steps without explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
uv run, trigger other skills through the menu system, and read arbitrary project files. - Sanitization: None. The instructions perform no validation or sanitization of the content loaded from the configuration files before adopting the persona or executing steps.
Audit Metadata