gds-agent-game-designer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script using uv run to resolve its activation configuration. This occurs in SKILL.md at Step 1: uv run {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is instructed to iterate through and execute arbitrary steps defined in the activation_steps_prepend and activation_steps_append arrays within customize.toml and its overrides. While the defaults are empty, this mechanism allows for the execution of arbitrary instructions or actions provided by external configuration files at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it derives its persona, role, and core instructions from external project files.
  • Ingestion points: Configuration is read from SKILL.md (Step 1 and 5) via customize.toml, {project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.toml, and {project-root}/_bmad/gds/config.yaml. Additionally, Step 4 loads arbitrary files from the project root specified in persistent_facts.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill instructs the agent to treat configuration entries as foundational facts and to execute steps without explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via uv run, trigger other skills through the menu system, and read arbitrary project files.
  • Sanitization: None. The instructions perform no validation or sanitization of the content loaded from the configuration files before adopting the persona or executing steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 12:17 PM