gds-agent-game-solo-dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Python script located at
{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyusinguv runduring the activation process. It also executes instructions defined inactivation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_appendconfiguration fields. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to dynamically execute steps and prompts loaded from configuration variables, allowing for runtime instruction generation from external files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's persona, identity, and foundational context are derived from external configuration files (
customize.toml,config.yaml, and project-specific.tomlfiles) located in the project directory. - Ingestion points: Configuration is loaded from
{project-root}/_bmad/custom/,{project-root}/_bmad/gds/config.yaml, and file paths defined inagent.persistent_facts. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious commands within these ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, run local Python scripts, and read local files into the LLM context.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the configuration data before it is used to drive agent behavior.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
agent.persistent_factsmechanism allows for loading the contents of arbitrary files from the filesystem (using thefile:prefix) into the agent's context, which could be abused to expose sensitive information if configuration files are compromised.
Audit Metadata