gds-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands for version control operations, including
git diff,git diff --cached,git diff HEAD, andgit branch. It also utilizes the GitHub CLI (gh pr view) to resolve pull request references. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow architecture executes arbitrary commands defined in the
workflow.activation_steps_prependandworkflow.activation_steps_appendconfiguration arrays loaded fromcustomize.tomland project-specific override files. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute a script located at{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py. This script is external to the skill's distribution and resides within the user's project directory under the vendor's_bmadnamespace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data during its core workflow, creating a vulnerability surface for malicious instructions embedded in project files or code changes.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from git diffs (
diff_output), specification/story files ({spec_file}), and sprint tracking documents ({sprint_status}). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing the
diff_outputto sub-agents like the Blind Hunter or Edge Case Hunter. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
git,gh,uv), perform network reads via GitHub CLI, and write findings back to project files and backlog templates. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content of code diffs or specification files is performed before they are processed by the LLM or sub-agents.
Audit Metadata