gds-investigate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data, including log files, diagnostic archives, and issue tracker tickets, which can serve as vectors for malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The workflow in
SKILL.md(Outcome 1 and Outcome 2) explicitly reads content from external issue trackers, log files, stack traces, and diagnostic archives. Additionally,Step 3loads files matching the broad glob pattern{project-root}/**/project-context.mdas foundational context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not mandate the use of delimiters or specific "ignore" warnings when the agent or its subagents process these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write case files to the filesystem and execute shell commands (such as
grep,git, and theon_completehooks) which could be targeted by injected instructions. - Sanitization: While the
{slug}used for file naming is sanitized to prevent path traversal, the actual content ingested from logs or tickets is not filtered for potential prompt injection patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill incorporates multiple mechanisms for executing shell commands and scripts defined in its configuration.
- Activation scripts: During initialization, the skill executes
python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyto process its workflow configuration. - Configurable hooks: The
customize.tomlfile provides fields foractivation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_completewhich allow the execution of arbitrary shell commands. While these are intended for legitimate automation (e.g., repository management or notification), they represent a primary mechanism for command execution.
Audit Metadata