bmad-agent-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute local Python scripts:{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyand{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_config.py. This grants the skill the ability to run code from the project directory.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the project's local environment through its customization and configuration loading steps.\n - Ingestion points: Reads configuration from
{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.tomland{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.user.toml.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions perform a deep merge of configuration without explicitly filtering or delimiting instruction content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary instructions defined in
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_append, and can load files viapersistent_facts.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the logic for merging and executing steps does not appear to sanitize input from project-local files.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While no direct network exfiltration was found, the
persistent_factsmechanism allows loading file contents into the agent's context via thefile:prefix and glob patterns (e.g.,file:{project-root}/**). This creates a risk of sensitive local files being exposed to the model context if broad or malicious glob patterns are configured in the project's customization files.
Audit Metadata