bmad-build-auto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project planning artifacts (PRD, architecture, UX/design documents) and
stories.yamlto compile context and generate implementation tasks. - Ingestion points:
stories.yamlinstep-01-clarify-and-route.mdand planning artifacts incompile-epic-context.md. - Boundary markers: Lacks explicit "ignore embedded instructions" guards when processing these documents.
- Capability inventory: File system access, shell execution via
uv, and subagent spawning. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content before LLM processing.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Subagents designed for code review are tasked with reading code diffs and specification files. These external files represent a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded to manipulate the review outcome or subsequent agent actions.
- Ingestion points:
{spec_file}instep-03-implement.mdand{diff_file}instep-04-review.md. - Boundary markers: The
implementation_handoffincustomize.tomldeclares the spec as the "sole source of truth" without warning against embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: Write access to project files, version control operations, and autonomous subagent execution.
- Sanitization: Relies on LLM reasoning without content filtering.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The main skill entry point (
SKILL.md) executes a project-local script (_bmad/scripts/render_skill.py) using theuvtool. While part of the intended BMad framework, this execution depends on the integrity of the files within the user's project directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates complex workflows by dynamically loading instructions from multiple internal markdown files (steps 1-4) and spawning several subagents for specialized tasks like planning, implementation, and multi-layer review as defined in
customize.toml.
Audit Metadata