bmad-product-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from user-uploaded transcripts, memos, decks, and web research results. This content could contain malicious instructions designed to influence or override the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The Discovery section involves reading various user-provided documents and subagent-generated digests from web searches. The skill also loads local project files as facts based on configuration in
customize.toml. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of protective delimiters or distinct instructions for the model to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including executing local Python scripts via
uv run, writing to the local file system (brief.md,.memlog.md), and calling external MCP tools for data retrieval and handoffs. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not include steps for sanitizing or validating external content before it is used in the prompt context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts using the
uv runcommand. While these scripts (resolve_customization.py,resolve_config.py,memlog.py) appear to be part of the skill framework's intended logic, this functionality demonstrates a powerful shell execution capability that could be targeted or misused. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill spawns subagents for web research and can consult external internal tool registries or MCP tools during discovery and finalization. While these are described as organization-configured, they represent a network interaction surface for data movement.
Audit Metadata