bmad-spec
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using
uv runto invoke internal scripts likememlog.py. The--textparameter in these calls is populated directly from user-provided input (transcripts, emails, Slack threads). This creates a high risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters or unbalanced quotes intended to break out of the command string. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's activation logic includes running steps defined in the
activation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_completeconfiguration fields fromcustomize.toml. Since these fields can be overridden by project-specific or user-specific configuration files, it enables arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from external sources like meeting transcripts and customer emails to generate formal specifications.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddescribes the ingestion of "mixed multi-source" intent input. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions provided to the agent to ignore embedded commands or instructions within the external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files to the project directory and execute shell commands via the
uvtoolchain. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input data is performed before it is logged or processed by the underlying scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata