bmad-agent-ux-designer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts using the
uvtool during its activation sequence. It specifically targets{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyand{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_config.py. If these scripts are modified by a malicious actor within a project, they will be executed when the skill is activated. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute arbitrary instructions defined in
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_append. These steps are defined in thecustomize.tomlfile and its overrides, allowing the execution of any action the agent is capable of before and after the main greeting. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and merges configuration data from multiple local files, including team and user-specific overrides. This data directly influences the agent's persona, principles, and activation steps, creating an attack surface where malicious local files could control the agent.
- Ingestion points:
customize.toml,{project-root}/_bmad/custom/bmad-agent-ux-designer.toml, and{project-root}/_bmad/custom/bmad-agent-ux-designer.user.toml. - Boundary markers: None identified for configuration merging or fact loading.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
uv run, execution of arbitrary activation steps, and invocation of other skills via the menu system. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the merged configuration content is performed within the skill instructions.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
persistent_factsmechanism allows the skill to load the contents of any file or glob pattern (e.g.,file:{project-root}/**) into the agent's prompt context. While intended for project knowledge, this could be used to expose sensitive local files if configured to do so in the override files.
Audit Metadata