bmad-deep-recon

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources, including external research reports (references/process.md) and web search results (references/run.md).
  • Ingestion points: External reports are copied to imports/ and read by subagents; web search results are fanned out to researcher assistants.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a "research firewall" rule, where subagents receive only their specific brief and no ambient project context (memory, code, or persistent facts) unless explicitly granted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses uv run to execute local Python scripts (scripts/recon_kit.py) and utilizes subagents with tool access (web search).
  • Sanitization: External content is processed by recon_kit.py, which includes a dedicated command (escape-sources) to validate URLs (http/s only) and escape HTML content before rendering the final briefing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes configuration-driven extension hooks (activation_steps_prepend, activation_steps_append, and on_complete in customize.toml) which execute instructions stored in variables. While these are intended features for customization, they represent a surface where instructions are dynamically injected into the agent's flow based on configuration files.
  • [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices by using deterministic local scripts for high-stakes tasks like citation tallying and HTML escaping, rather than relying on LLM intuition. The explicit "research firewall" and citation validation logic demonstrate a high level of security awareness.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 10:42 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bmad-deep-recon