bmad-deep-recon
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources, including external research reports (
references/process.md) and web search results (references/run.md). - Ingestion points: External reports are copied to
imports/and read by subagents; web search results are fanned out to researcher assistants. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a "research firewall" rule, where subagents receive only their specific brief and no ambient project context (memory, code, or persistent facts) unless explicitly granted.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
uv runto execute local Python scripts (scripts/recon_kit.py) and utilizes subagents with tool access (web search). - Sanitization: External content is processed by
recon_kit.py, which includes a dedicated command (escape-sources) to validate URLs (http/s only) and escape HTML content before rendering the final briefing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes configuration-driven extension hooks (
activation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_completeincustomize.toml) which execute instructions stored in variables. While these are intended features for customization, they represent a surface where instructions are dynamically injected into the agent's flow based on configuration files. - [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices by using deterministic local scripts for high-stakes tasks like citation tallying and HTML escaping, rather than relying on LLM intuition. The explicit "research firewall" and citation validation logic demonstrate a high level of security awareness.
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