bmad-os-findings-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted findings and source files through sub-agents, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Findings are ingested from markdown report files, inline text, or pre-populated task lists. Sub-agents also read arbitrary source code files and context documents (SKILL.md, agent-prompt.md).
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including automated commits (tam-commit), code pushes (tam-push), and the ability to resolve GitHub PR threads via API calls (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined in the sub-agent prompt (agent-prompt.md) to warn agents against following instructions potentially embedded within the findings or source code.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of external content before it influences automated actions such as updating tasks or closing findings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform operations on pull requests, including posting comments and executing GraphQL mutations to resolve review threads.
- Evidence: Phase 3.4 of SKILL.md details the use of
gh pr commentandgh api graphqlto manage PR states based on the triage outcomes.
Audit Metadata