bmad-os-findings-triage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted findings and source files through sub-agents, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Findings are ingested from markdown report files, inline text, or pre-populated task lists. Sub-agents also read arbitrary source code files and context documents (SKILL.md, agent-prompt.md).
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including automated commits (tam-commit), code pushes (tam-push), and the ability to resolve GitHub PR threads via API calls (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined in the sub-agent prompt (agent-prompt.md) to warn agents against following instructions potentially embedded within the findings or source code.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of external content before it influences automated actions such as updating tasks or closing findings.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform operations on pull requests, including posting comments and executing GraphQL mutations to resolve review threads.
  • Evidence: Phase 3.4 of SKILL.md details the use of gh pr comment and gh api graphql to manage PR states based on the triage outcomes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 09:22 PM